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rom a legal or regulatory perspective, network neutrality refers to a 
policy principle regarding access for online content and service 
providers to broadband networks. It implies a general and ex ante
obligation of non-discrimination for network operators  1 when granting 
access to Internet content providers 2 and users, with the aim of excluding 
practices such as blocking access to non-affiliated content, degrading the 
quality of transmission, imposing unreasonable restrictions or prioritising 
affiliated content. Whether such obligation should be "cast in the Stone 
Tables" of the law (REDING, 2008) was first fiercely debated in the United 
States (US). There it was opposed (and is still opposed) by fierce defenders 
of "Internet freedoms" (including the right to access Internet content, run 
applications and connect devices without undue restrictions by network 
operators, as well as equal treatment of all bits and bytes), and also by those 
who claim that the Internet has never been neutral and that innovation and 
new online services require traffic management techniques. The issue is 
now gaining increased attention in other parts of the world, especially the 
European Union (EU), where the regulatory framework for electronic 
communications 3 (the 2003 Regulatory Framework) is currently under 
review. In the context of this review, the discussion on network neutrality 
shifts the attention of the electronic communications industry from dealing 
with former network monopolies to the possible tension between network 
operators and Internet content providers.  
This article analyses the major network neutrality problems in the light of 
the current and future EU sector regulation for the electronic 
communications sector. In the section following this Introduction, we present 
the core debate on network neutrality. In the subsequent section, we analyse 
the applicability of the 2003 Regulatory Framework. In the next section, we 
focus on the reform proposals of the European Commission (the 
Commission) of November 2007 and on the amendments adopted by the 
European Parliament (the Parliament) on 24
th September 2008. 4 Finally, we 
provide conclusions. 
1 “Network operators” refer to operators that provide Internet access and data transmission 
services to their customers including both Internet end-users and Internet content providers. 
2 “Internet content providers” refer to operators providing content, applications, services, et
cetera, based on the platform of the Internet, to Internet end-users, e.g. Google, Yahoo!, 
YouTube, etc.
3 See all the legal instruments within the 2003 Regulatory Framework at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/current/index_en.htm. 
4 All the documents related to the reform of the electronic communications regulatory package 
can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&DosId=196418.
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We argue that many aspects of network neutrality are beyond the scope 
of the current 2003 Regulatory Framework, but that the reform proposals (in 
particular the amendments suggested by Parliament) are a step into the right 
direction. A detailed analysis of the application of EU competition rules to 
problems in the area of the network neutrality falls outside the scope of this 
article, but we can refer the reader to earlier papers on this topic (in 
particular CHIRICO, VAN DER HAAR & LAROUCHE, 2007; VALCKE, HOU, 
STEVENS & KOSTA, 2008). 
  Network neutrality: debate and arguments 
The emerging concern about network neutrality is triggered by 
technological changes. The current Internet is designed based on the so-
called "end-to-end principle" (SALTZER, REED & CLARK, 1984), which 
allows all data flows to be transmitted without any form of priority. Although 
this mechanism deals well with delay-insensitive applications, e.g. Email and 
web browsing, it does not sufficiently support rising delay-sensitive 
applications, such as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), streaming video, 
online video gaming, etc, which demand guaranteed performance of data 
transmission to a certain level, i.e. quality of service. In order to meet this 
demand, engineers developed during the last decade "traffic prioritisation" 
techniques (also known as "traffic shaping" or "access-tiering") (OECD, 
2007). This gives network operators extensive flexibility (exceeding the 
extent to which they managed traffic congestion with certain prioritisation 
techniques in the past) in determining the way that data packets and traffic 
are sent or received on a given network to the extent to which quality of 
service can be secured. However, while this new technology can meet the 
demand of delay-sensitive applications, it can also potentially allow network 
operators to treat data flows from different Internet content providers in a 
discriminatory way.  
Although network neutrality has been described in many ways that 
emphasise different goals, at the heart of the debate lies the question of 
whether or not the Internet should be open, neutral and accessible to all on 
equal conditions (WU, 2003). Are "all bits created equal" and should the law 
therefore ensure equal treatment of all Internet users (as a "Guardian Knight 
that will allow the proverbial '2 guys in a garage' to be able to amaze the 
world with the next big thing" – as Commissioner Reding recently phrased it 92     No. 72, 4
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in her speech in Copenhagen)? Or does openness for innovation necessarily 
imply legitimate network management practices (recognising that – quoting 
Commissioner Reding in the same speech – "for instance, traffic 
prioritisation can sometimes be an important driver of value and growth for 
operators"). A large part of the network neutrality debate focuses on network 
operators that, based on their market power, discriminate against particular 
Internet content providers or certain types of legitimate 5 data flow (PEHA, 
LEHR & WILKIE, 2007). This is especially the case with network operators 
who are vertically integrated or have alliances with content providers 
because these network operators are considered to have enhanced 
incentives to require other content providers (who may also be consumers) 
to pay a "toll" to use the higher speed networks that they in turn offer to end-
users (MARSDEN, 2007). 
In order to better identify possible problems flowing from absence of an 
adequate network neutrality policy, we first turn to the US legislative 
proposals. By late 2005, network neutrality regulations were included in 
several US Congressional draft bills, as a part of ongoing proposals to 
reform the US Telecommunications Act of 1996. Until present, there have 
been seven attempts to regulate network neutrality in the US. However, the 
first five attempts failed and only the last two bills, the Internet Freedom and 
Preservation Act 6 and the Internet Freedom Preservation Act of 2008, 7 are 
currently still under review by the relevant US legislative bodies. These two 
US drafts focus in particular on the following discriminatory practices by 
network operators: 
- the  blocking of the ability of particular Internet content providers to use 
broadband services;  
- the  degrading of the ability of particular Internet content providers to 
use broadband services;  
-  the imposing of unreasonable restrictions with regard to attaching 
certain devices or as to which applications that may be used on the 
networks of network operators; and 
5 Illegal data flow, violating, for example, human rights, copyrights, et cetera, is not an issue 
related to network neutrality. 
6 The full text of the Internet Freedom and Preservation Act is available at: 
http://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/s215-110-20070109.pdf.  
7 The full text of the Internet Freedom and Preservation Act of 2008 is available at: 
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-  the providing of prioritisation only to particular Internet content 
providers. 8
Furthermore, contrary to what some literature alleges (e.g. SURA, 2006), 
we are of the opinion that network neutrality is not "a solution in search of a 
problem". A number of practical incidents or cases in the information and 
communications sector both in the US and in Europe confirm this point of 
view. For example, in the Madison River case, a US telephone company 
blocked the ability of its digital subscriber line (DSL) customers to use VoIP 
services. 9 Later, in the conflict that involved Comcast Corporation, a US 
network operator was sued for preventing bitTorrent users from seeding 
files. 10 In Europe, some network operators have reportedly blocked VoIP 
and peer-to-peer systems (GEIST, 2005). Similarly, the removal by some UK 
mobile operators of VoIP functionality from Nokia N95 handsets in 2007 also 
triggered network neutrality concerns (TRUPHONE, 2007). Prioritisation, 
which implies a higher level of traffic shaping than blockage or 
degradation, 11 has not yet been fully installed by network operators. 
Nevertheless, PlusNet, a UK-based network operator, has already started 
selling prioritised services based on different types of Internet 
applications. 12 Last but not least, several network operators have also 
expressed their intention to discriminate against some Internet content 
providers (Save the Internet, 2008).  
8 The Internet Freedom and Preservation Act requires that prioritisation should be provided free 
of charge. However, there is no consensus even among network neutrality proponents whether 
this should actually be the case. Therefore, the issue related to prioritization pricing is beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
9 See Madison River Communications, L.L.C. and Affiliated Companies, Order, File No. EB-05-
IH-0110, 20 F.C.C.R. 4295 (Enforcement Bureau, 2005). 
10 See Federal Communications Decision of USA, Memorandum Opinion and Order, File No. 
EB-08-IH-1518, adopted: August 1, 2008 and released: August 20, 2008, available at:   
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-08-183A1.doc. 
11 From a technical point of view, it is more difficult to prioritise a particular data flow than to 
delay or to block it. (OECD, 2007) 
12 See PlusNet’s policy on its prioritised broadband at: 
http://www.plus.net/support/broadband/quality_broadband/. 94     No. 72, 4
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  The 2003 Regulatory Framework  
vs. network neutrality issues 
In this part, we examine the effectiveness of the 2003 Regulatory 
Framework to address the aforementioned network neutrality problems. The 
European regulatory framework, comprised of a set of directives, was 
adopted in 2002 and came into force in 2003. With regard to the restrictions 
on market behaviours of broadband network operators, there are three 
mechanisms provided by the 2003 Regulatory Framework that may be of 
relevance for network neutrality problems: the significant market power 
(SMP) regime, the general principles on access to electronic 
communications networks and services and consumer protection issues. 
However, before analysing these provisions in detail, it is important to 
present the general scope of application of the 2003 Regulatory Framework.  
Electronic communications services versus Internet content 
The 2003 Regulatory Framework only applies to electronic 
communications networks and services. In Article 2(c) of the Framework 
Directive, an electronic communications service is defined as:  
"a service normally provided for remuneration which consists wholly or 
mainly in the conveyance of signals on electronic communications 
networks, including telecommunications services and transmission 
services in networks used for broadcasting, but exclude services 
providing, or exercising editorial control over, content transmitted using 
electronic communications networks and services; it does not include 
information society services, as defined in Article 1 of Directive 
98/34/EC, which do not consist wholly or mainly in the conveyance of 
signals on electronic communications networks". 13
Hence, electronic communications services in the context of the 2003 
Regulatory Framework apparently include neither broadcasting services, nor 
non-linear audiovisual media services, nor online services that provide 
content or information services or applications over the Internet. Since these 
"do not consist wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals", such 
information society services are not covered by the definition of electronic 
13 See Article 2(c) of Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
March 7, 2002 on a common Regulatory Framework for electronic communications networks 
and services, [2002] O.J. L 108/33 (Framework Directive). P. VALCKE, L. HOU, D. STEVENS & E. KOSTA  95 
communications services.  This undoubtedly contrasts strongly with the fact 
that network neutrality potentially concerns all the data flows transmitted 
over the Internet, or particularly data flows generated by (independent) 
content or information providers.  
The fact that these market players fall out of the scope of the 2003 
Regulatory Framework has a number practical consequences. Article 20 of 
the Framework Directive grants national regulatory authorities (the NRAs) 
the power to resolve disputes between undertakings. However, it limits this 
dispute resolution mechanism only to disputes "between undertakings 
providing electronic communications networks and services".  14 Hence, 
disputes between network operators and Internet content providers that are 
not considered undertakings providing electronic communications networks 
and services in the context of the 2003 Regulatory Framework are not in the 
scope of this provision. Therefore, regulators cannot in principle resolve 
disputes involving Internet content providers.  
At this stage, it is clear that - because of its limited scope - the 2003 
Regulatory Framework will not be able to resolve all network neutrality 
problems. In particular, problems with regard to providers of "services 
providing, or exercising editorial control over, content" and "information 
society services" might encounter significant problems in seeing their access 
rights enforced.  
In the following three sections, we examine the applicability of the 2003 
Regulatory Framework to the aforementioned network neutrality problems, 
excluding those related to services providing, or exercising editorial control 
over, content transmitted using electronic communications networks and 
services, or information society services. 
The SMP regime 
The most important regulatory instrument under the 2003 Regulatory 
Framework lies in the so-called SMP regime. According to this regime, in 
order to regulate network operators, the NRAs should define relevant 
markets for particular electronic communications networks or services. After 
defining a relevant market, NRAs must conduct a market analysis to find out 
whether there is one or more undertakings that enjoy(s) SMP. The concept 
14 Ibid, Article 20. 96     No. 72, 4
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of SMP is equivalent to the notion of "dominance" under Article 82 of the EC 
Treaty 15. In cases where no undertaking is found to have SMP, sector 
specific obligations should be rolled back on the market concerned. On the 
contrary, if the NRAs designate one or more SMP operators on the relevant 
market, they have to impose at least one obligation on that (those) 
undertaking(s). NRAs can choose from a range of remedies listed in the 
Access Directive and including transparency, non-discrimination, accounting 
separation, obligatory access, and price control. 16
Important to note however is that the NRAs have to take into utmost 
account the list of (now) seven relevant markets, as identified by the 
European Commission in its recommendation on relevant product and 
service markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to 
ex ante regulation (the Recommendation). 17 It is consequently crucial to 
examine whether the relevant market(s) for network neutrality problems is 
(are) included in the list of the recommended markets. 
First, we should investigate which precise markets are involved in the 
problems that we described earlier in relation to network neutrality. In the 
current landscape, not many Internet content providers build their own 
15 Ibid, Article 14. 
16 See Articles 9-13 of Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
March 7, 2002 on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and 
services, [2002] O.J. L 108/7 (Access Directive). It should be noted that within the 
Commission’s proposals for amending the Access Directive, NRAs could also impose a new 
obligation of functional separation. See Article 13a, the Commission Proposal for a DIRECTIVE 
OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Directives 2002/21/EC 
on a common Regulatory Framework for electronic communications networks and services, 
2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and 
services, and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and 
services (hereinafter “the Better Regulation proposal”), available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/library/proposals/697/com_2007_0697_en.pdf. 
17 See COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION of 17 December 2007 on relevant product and 
service markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in 
accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a 
common Regulatory Framework for electronic communications networks and services, 
2007/879/EC, 28.12.2007, O.J. L 344/65 (hereinafter: the 2007 Recommendation). This is the 
second edition of the European Commission recommendation on relevant product and service 
markets. The first edition dated from 2003 and listed 18 markets as susceptible to ex ante
regulation (COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION of 11 February 2003 on relevant product and 
service markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in 
accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a 
common Regulatory Framework for electronic communication networks and services, 
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networks to provide services to end-users. 18 Network operators usually act 
as intermediaries, taking care of broadband access and data transmission 
between Internet content providers and end-users. Furthermore, if Internet 
content providers and end-users are not within a same broadband network, 
a wholesale broadband transit service between different network operators 
is also necessary. Moreover, since network operators and Internet content 
providers operate at different levels of the value chain, the markets for deals 
between network operators and their customers (i.e. Internet content 
providers and end-users) are in general retail markets. Consequently, there 
are four groups of parties and two types of markets involved in the entire 
transaction, as described by figure 1.  
Figure 1 - Relevant markets related to network neutrality 
For a more detailed scheme, see: CHIRICO, VAN DER HAAR & LAROUCHE, 2007, at p.18) 
Subsequently, we should analyse whether the markets where network 
(on my computer the diagram covers the text) neutrality problems may arise 
fall into the list of the relevant markets recommended by the Commission. As 
shown in Figure 1, the major network neutrality problems concern 
discrimination by network operators against Internet content providers and 
18 Google built a wireless broadband network in San Francisco in 2003. Network neutrality 
opponents consider this as evidence that discrimination of network operators can incentivise 
Internet content providers entering markets for Internet infrastructures, thereby promoting 
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end-users are present in retail broadband markets. However, retail 
broadband markets are not listed as recommended markets susceptible to 
ex ante regulation within the Recommendation, thereby making the NRAs 
unable to deal with network neutrality problems based on the SMP regime. 
The Recommendation provides an opportunity for the NRAs to define 
markets beyond the Commission's recommendation. 19 The high burden of 
proof related to this deviation nevertheless deters the NRAs from analysing 
additional markets (so far, no NRA has defined and/or analysed retail 
broadband markets).  
Let's assume that an NRA would define and analyse retail broadband 
markets, could it then impose effective regulatory remedies to solve network 
neutrality problems? The regulatory remedies available to the NRAs are 
transparency, non-discrimination, accounting separation, mandatory access 
and/or price control. All these remedies, however, aim at enabling alternative 
operators to obtain "interconnection and/or access". 20 In the current Access 
Directive, access is defined as "the making available of facilities and/or 
services, to another undertaking […] for the purpose of providing electronic 
communications services" 21 while interconnection refers to interconnection 
to "the physical and logical linking of public communications networks" 
between network operators. 22 Apparently, all these regulatory remedies are 
confined to regulating the relationship between network operators, or in 
other words electronic communications networks or services providers, and 
cannot extend to the services provided to customers that in this case are 
Internet content providers and end-users. Therefore, some NRAs – like the 
French ARCEP – are of the opinion that it is "basically regulating disputes 
between operators for 'access' or 'interconnection' issues" and has "no 
competences to regulate content service providers or disputes between 
content providers and operators" (GAUTHEY, 2007). 
In summary, the SMP regime is not well adapted to cover network 
neutrality problems because (1) no retail broadband markets were ever 
included into ex ante regulation and (2) even if an NRA manages to include 
a retail broadband market into markets susceptible to ex ante regulation, the 
regulatory tools still limit their ability to deal with network neutrality problems. 
19 See Article 2 of the 2007 Recommendation, supra note 17. 
20 See Article 9-13, the Access Directive, supra note 16. 
21 Ibid, Article 2(a). 
22 Ibid, Article 2(b). P. VALCKE, L. HOU, D. STEVENS & E. KOSTA  99 
The Article 5 regime 
The second instrument can be found in Article 5 of the Access 
Directive 23, which provides the NRAs with the possibility to, in predefined 
circumstances, regulate network operators regardless of the existence of 
SMP. According to this provision, NRAs are able to impose:  
x  to the extent that is necessary to ensure end-to-end connectivity, 
obligations on undertakings that control access to end-users, including in 
justified cases, the obligation to interconnect their networks where this is not 
already the case and  
x  to the extent that is necessary to ensure accessibility for end-users to 
digital radio and television broadcasting services specified by the Member 
State, obligations on operators to provide access to the other facilities on 
fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.  
It should be noted that this provision — in contrast to the SMP regime, 
which is tightly monitored by the European Commission — grants NRAs a 
greater flexibility to handle national circumstances, and leaves them a 
considerable margin of discretion in dealing with issues of access and 
interconnection. 
The application of the Article 5 regime is however also constrained by the 
definition of access and interconnection in the same way as the SMP 
regime. The only difference between the two regimes is that the existence of 
SMP is not required when imposing obligations under the Article 5 regime. 
Since access and interconnection are not relevant to retail broadband 
services provided to Internet content providers and end-users, the Article 5 
regime cannot easily be applied to solve network neutrality problems either.  
Consumer protection provisions 
The provisions on consumer protection and universal service are a third 
possible regulatory instrument. They require certain types of electronic 
communications services to be available for all end-users at an affordable 
price (universal service obligations, or "USO") and a certain degree of 
transparency concerning contracts of provision of electronic communications 
23 Ibid, Article 5. 100     No. 72, 4
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services. 24 However, at present broadband Internet access (with specified 
characteristics in terms of quality and price) is not included in the list of EU 
universal service obligations. 25 Almost all other provisions in the area of 
consumer protection (such as contractual and transparency obligations) only 
relate to public telephony, rather than broadband Internet. Therefore, the 
current provisions on universal service and consumer protection are also not 
of help in resolving problems related to network neutrality.  
Summarizing, in this section we demonstrated that the three most 
important instruments from the current EU Regulatory Framework (i.e. SMP, 
general access obligations and consumer protection provisions) are not 
sufficiently apt to deal with network neutrality problems involving Internet 
content providers and/or end-users, mainly because of the limited scope of 
application of the framework.  26 The subsequent section will examine 
whether the electronic communications reform proposals are likely to bring a 
breakthrough.  
24 See Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of March 7, 2002 
on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and 
services, [2002] O.J. L108/51 (Universal Service Directive). 
25 See, The Commission adopted Communication on the second periodic review of the scope 
of universal service in electronic communications in accordance with Article 15 of Directive 
2002/22/EC.  It also provides some broad reflections on the role of universal service in meeting 
wider challenges at European level - in particular ensuring access to broadband - in order to 
open a debate about possible future policy, COM(2008) 572 final, 25 September 2008, p 8. 
26 It should be noted, though, that some commentators disagree, stressing that there is a 
difference between the addressees of the obligations under the 2003 Regulatory Framework 
(which should be electronic communications networks or services providers) and the 
beneficiaries (which could be content providers). There are indeed elements in the Regulatory 
Framework pointing to this conclusion, like the rules on conditional access systems in Article 6 
of the Access Directive (which benefit broadcasters) or the inclusion of market 18 (market for 
broadcasting transmission) in the first Recommendation on Relevant Markets. Since the 
application of the framework to the benefit of content providers is at least open for interpretation, 
we decided to take a prudent position in this paper, defending the viewpoint that the framework 
cannot be used to deal with discrimination of Internet content providers by network operators in 
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  Electronic communications reform proposals 
Background 
The 2003 Regulatory Framework is currently subject to revision by the 
European legislator. On 13 November 2007, the Commission put forward its 
proposals to enhance the 2003 Regulatory Framework.  27 A first draft 
directive 28 (commonly called the "Better Regulation proposal") proposes 
amendments to the Framework, Access and Authorisation Directives. A 
second one 29 (the "Citizens Rights proposal") contains amendments to the 
Universal Service and e-Privacy Directives. It is mainly in the latter that the 
Commission articulated its position on network neutrality. 
Following the so-called co-decision procedure based on Article 251 of the 
EC Treaty, the Commission's legislative proposals have to be approved by 
the Council of the European Union (the Council) and the Parliament. After 
receiving the Commission proposals, the Council and the Parliament held 
several hearings involving interested parties from different backgrounds. On 
24
th September 2008, the Parliament adopted in first reading a legislative 
resolution 30 approving, with amendments, the draft directives. The Council's 
common position is expected for mid-November 2008; however, chances 
27 More details can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&DosId=196418.  
28 See the Better Regulation proposal, supra note 16. 
29 See the Commission Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
OF THE COUNCIL amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights 
relating to electronic communications networks, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications 
sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on consumer protection cooperation (the proposed 
Universal Service Directive), 2007 (hereinafter “the Citizens Rights proposal”), available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/library/proposals/698/com_2007_0698_en.pdf.
30 See, European Parliament legislative resolution of 24 September 2008 on the proposal for a 
directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2002/22/EC on 
universal service and users‘ rights relating to electronic communications networks, Directive 
2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the 
electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on consumer protection 
cooperation (COM(2007)0698 – C6-0420/2007 – 2007/0248(COD)), Wednesday, 24 September 
2008 – Brussels (hereinafter: the Resolution), available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P6-TA-2008-0452. 102     No. 72, 4
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are high that Parliament will need a second reading before the directives will 
be finally adopted. 31
The issue of network neutrality and "open networks" led the Commission 
and Parliament to suggest several amendments to the Universal Service 
Directive. The following sections will evaluate the effectiveness of these 
specific proposals to solve the network neutrality problems on which we 
focus in this article: blockage, degradation, restrictions on applications and 
terminal equipments and prioritisation. But before, we would like to draw 
attention to amendments of a more general nature, which may have an 
impact on the net neutrality debate.  
A first issue is the possible extension of the framework to deal with 
conflicts between electronic communications networks and services 
providers on the one hand and content or information service providers on 
the other hand. To that end, the Commission proposed to broaden the notion 
of access (defined in Article 2 Access Directive) so as to include: 
"the making available of facilities and/or services to another 
undertaking, under defined conditions, on either an exclusive or non-
exclusive basis, for the purpose of providing electronic 
communications services, or delivering information society services or 
broadcast content services" (Emphasis added) 
and extend the dispute resolution powers of NRAs (Article 20 Framework 
Directive) to: 
"dispute[s] between service providers […] where one of the parties is 
an undertaking providing electronic communications networks or 
services" (Emphasis added).  
The European Parliament endorsed the latter, but reformulated the first to 
the cryptic phrase "access means the making available of facilities and/or 
services to another undertaking, under defined conditions, on either an 
exclusive or non-exclusive basis, for the purpose of providing electronic 
communications services, including the delivery of information society 
services or broadcast content services" (Emphasis added) – cryptic because 
the definition of electronic communications services explicitly excludes 
"services providing, or exercising editorial control over, content" (supra).
31 At the time of writing of this paper, the 4
th of May 2009 is mentioned as indicative date for the 
second reading in Parliament’s plenary sitting. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/file.jsp?id=5563972 P. VALCKE, L. HOU, D. STEVENS & E. KOSTA  103 
The second category of amendments we would like to bring to the 
forefront before turning to the proposals specifically tailored to the network 
neutrality debate, are those clarifying the policy objectives for NRAs in 
Article 8 Framework Directive. The Commission's proposals – as amended 
by Parliament – would lead to the specification that NRAs have to promote 
competition by inter alia: 
"(b) ensuring that there is no distortion or restriction of competition in 
the electronic communications sector, in particular for the delivery of 
and access to content and services across all networks" (Emphasis 
added) 
and promote citizens' interests by inter alia:  
"(g) applying the principle that end-users should be able to access and 
distribute any lawful content and use any lawful applications and/or 
services of their choice and for this purpose contributing to the 
promotion of lawful content in accordance with Article 33 of Directive 
2002/22/EC (Universal Service Directive)" (Emphasis added). 
Blockage 
Blockage refers to the case where network operators refuse to carry data 
from particular Internet content providers. In its Impact Assessment the 
Commission explained that blockage should not be a concern for two 
reasons. First, where there is genuine competition, blocked consumers can 
in principle switch to other broadband providers. Second, if there is no 
effective competition, "the national regulator can under the EU framework 
impose ex ante access obligations on the dominant operators so that 
alternative market players are given a chance to provide their own 
broadband access services". 32
Furthermore, even if high switching costs prevent affected consumers 
from finding alternative operators, Article 82 of the EC Treaty, in particular 
32 See the European Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment — 
Accompanying document to the Commission proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and the Council amending European Parliament and Council Directives 2002/19/EC, 
2002/20/EC and 202/21/EC; Commission proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and the Council amending European Parliament and Council Directives 2002/22/EC and 
2002/58/EC; Commission proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council 
establishing the European Electronic Communications Markets Authority, SEC(2007)1472 
(hereinafter “Impact Assessment”), 2007, p 92, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/library/proposals/ia_en.pdf. 104     No. 72, 4
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the "essential facilities doctrine", should possibly oblige dominant network 
operators to start or resume the broadband services concerned, provided 
that certain conditions are fulfilled (VALCKE, HOU, STEVENS & KOSTA, 
2008).  
Nevertheless, it can be noted that the Commission suggested the 
inclusion of a new Article 28.1 in the Universal Service Directive, stating that: 
"Member States shall ensure that NRAs take all necessary steps to 
ensure that: (a) end-users are able to access and use services, 
including information society services, provided within the 
Community…"  
The European Parliament, however, considered this provision to run 
contrary to the principle that, in a competitive environment, operators should 
be able to restrict access as long as it is disclosed (Harbour Report, p. 67). It 
has deleted the text (Amendment 96) and considers its amendment to Article 
22.3 (enabling NRAs to take action also in cases where there is competition 
but access is unreasonably restricted, infra) a more appropriate solution 
(note, however, that the policy objectives for NRAs in the new Article 8 
Framework Directive will still reflect the principle that end-users should be 
able to access and distribute any lawful content and use any lawful 
applications and/or services of their choice, supra).
Degradation 
Similar to blockage, network operators may also intentionally degrade 
data flows from Internet content providers, either to exclude them out of the 
market or to reserve part of their capacities to prioritised services. Degrading 
data transmission capabilities of unaffiliated Internet content providers by a 
dominant network operator, is without any doubt not allowed under the 
current EU rules. 33 However, a remaining problem is that  
"The current Regulatory Framework does not provide NRAs with the 
means to intervene were the quality of service for transmission in an 
IP-based communications environment to be degraded to 
unacceptably low levels, thereby frustrating the delivery of services 
from third parties." 34
33 Ibid, p. 91. 
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Therefore, the Commission proposed to introduce so-called "minimum 
quality of services requirements" in Article 22.3 of the Universal Service 
Directive:  
"In order to prevent degradation of service and slowing of traffic over 
networks, the Commission may, having consulted the Authority, adopt 
technical implementing measures concerning minimum quality of 
service requirements to be set by the national regulatory authority on 
undertakings providing public communications networks. These 
measures designed to amend non-essential elements of this Directive 
by supplementing it shall be adopted in accordance with the regulatory 
procedure with scrutiny referred to in Article 37(2). On imperative 
grounds of urgency, the Commission may use the urgency procedure 
referred to in Article 37(3)." 35
The Parliament agrees with the core of this proposal, but proposes two 
changes. First, the scope of application of minimum quality of service 
requirements is considerably extended, not only to prevent "degradation of 
service and slowing of traffic over networks", but also to ensure "the ability of 
users to access or distribute content or to run applications and services of 
their choice is not unreasonably restricted". Second, Parliament prefers the 
NRAs to take the initiative to "issue guidelines setting minimum quality of 
service requirements, and, if appropriate, take other measures". Only in a 
second stage could the Commission adopt technical implementing measures 
"if it considers that the guidelines or measures may create a barrier to the 
internal market".36
The proposal of minimum quality of service requirements, once adopted, 
should be sufficient to keep network operators, wishing to reserve capacities 
in order to provide prioritised access, from degrading their customer to 
unacceptably low levels. 
35 See the Citizens Rights proposal, p26, supra note 29. 
36 See, European Parliament legislative resolution of 24 September 2008 on the proposal for a 
directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2002/22/EC on 
universal service and users‘ rights relating to electronic communications networks, Directive 
2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the 
electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on consumer protection 
cooperation (COM(2007)0698 – C6-0420/2007 – 2007/0248(COD)), Wednesday, 24 September 
2008 – Brussels, (hereinafter: the Parliament Resolution) Amendment 193 [sik], available at: 
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Unreasonable restrictions on running applications  
or using equipments 
Network operators might restrict their customers' ability (1) to run specific 
Internet applications, such as peer-to-peer file sharing networks (as what 
took place in the US Comcast case 37), and/or (2) to use some terminal 
equipment, e.g. game consoles, for the purpose of managing their networks. 
Operators might abuse this right by imposing restrictions without any 
justification. The approaches of Parliament and Commission are slightly 
diverging. 
First, on the issue of unreasonable restrictions on applications the 
Commission accepts that the current 2003 Regulatory Framework is not 
sufficient to prevent network operators from setting unreasonable restrictions 
on running applications. Therefore, it proposes to apply on network 
operators a transparency obligation that requires them to clearly inform their 
subscribers "in advance of the conclusion of a contract and regularly 
thereafter of any limitations imposed by the provider on their ability to … run 
any lawful application and services of their choice." The Commission 
therefore proposes to add a new paragraph to Article 20.5 of the Universal 
Service Directive. The Parliament supports this information obligation, but 
moves the recurring information requirements (informing the subscriber not 
only at the moment of concluding the contract, but also regularly thereafter) 
to Article 21. Hence, in the Parliament's legislative resolution, the 
transparency obligation can be found in Articles 20.2 and 21.4.c of the 
Universal Service directive. Furthermore, as already mentioned in the last 
section, the NRAs and the Commission can even adopt minimum quality of 
service requirements based on the Parliament's proposed Article 22.3 in 
order to "ensure that the ability of users to access or distribute content or to 
run applications and services of their choice is not unreasonably 
restricted". 38 These two measures will force network operators to justify 
every restriction related to Internet applications. It is true that "unreasonably 
restricted" is a vague term leaving a broad margin of appreciation to the 
NRA, but such notions are not uncommon in law and should not necessarily 
lead to legal uncertainty as long as the NRA sets out its interpretation in a 
transparent and timely manner. Apparently, the European Parliament did not 
consider it necessary or appropriate to carry over the specification from the 
Harbour report that: 
37 See, supra note 10. 
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"National regulatory authorities may consider a limitation imposed by 
the operator on the ability of users to access or distribute lawful 
content or to run lawful applications and services of their choice to be 
unreasonable if it discriminates according to source, destination, 
content or type of application, and is not duly justified by the operator" 
(Harbour Report, at p. 191). 
Second, as far as unreasonable restrictions on terminal equipment are 
concerned, the Commission does not propose to take significant action. The 
Parliament on the other hand acknowledges this problem and proposes to 
oblige network operators to inform their subscribers of "any restrictions on 
the use of terminal equipment" (proposed Article 20.2, b Universal Service 
Directive). 39 Those restrictions should be included into the contracts 
between consumers and network operators. In short, the Parliament does 
not require the NRAs to actively intervene, but considers that increasing 
transparency is a sufficient safeguard to ensure that network operators do 
not distort competition, as well as to ensure that broadband markets remain 
or become competitive. 
Prioritisation
Prioritisation refers to a practice of network operators who apply traffic 
shaping technology to provide guaranteed quality of service. In general, the 
discussion on prioritisation is quite controversial. On the one hand, 
prioritisation is considered to be the best solution to improve quality of 
service from a technical perspective (NGNI, 2002). On the other hand, 
prioritisation can also potentially be applied in an anti-competitive manner in 
order to disadvantage competing services, thereby turning it into one of the 
most important network neutrality problems. From an academic point of 
view, arguments for and against prioritisation regulation seem to have equal 
weight (WU & YOO, 2007). Neither do the European Parliament and the 
Commission seem to entirely share the same view. 
On the one hand, the Commission seems quite convinced by the 
economic argument and states that prioritisation can lead to better product 
differentiation, which  
"is generally considered to be beneficial for the market (particular in 
industries with large fixed and sunk costs) so long as users have 
39 Ibid, Amendment 62. 108     No. 72, 4
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choice to access the transmission capabilities and the services they 
want. Allowing broadband operators to differentiate their products may 
make market entry of content providers more likely, thereby leading to 
a less concentrated industry and more consumer choice." 40
Furthermore, in case of problems resulting from prioritisation, the 
Commission alleged that the current EU rules "do not allow those who are in 
a dominant position to discriminate in an anti-competitive manner between 
consumers in similar situations". 41
The Commission therefore did not propose changes in policy regarding 
prioritisation. This position is questionable based on our analysis above: 
because of its limited scope of application the 2003 Regulatory Framework 
is not apt to deal with many network neutrality problems. In addition, in a 
previous article we argued that neither Article 82 nor Article 81 of the EC 
Treaty can sufficiently deal with discriminatory provision of prioritisation 
(VALCKE, HOU, STEVENS & KOSTA, 2008). Hence, the Commission's 
initial position seemed inadequate to us to treat these kinds of prioritisation 
problems. Therefore, we proposed a transparency obligation on network 
operators stating that they have to notify their prioritised services to the 
public and to the relevant authorities, such as the Commission and the 
NRAs, in order to enable them to intervene when they consider prioritisation 
damages consumer welfares (VALCKE, HOU, STEVENS & KOSTA, 2008). 
The Parliament seems to have noticed this gap with regard to 
prioritisation and is attempting to close it. In its legislative resolution, the 
Parliament proposed to amend Article 28.2.a of the Universal Service 
Directive in order to deal with the side effect of prioritisation, which suggests 
that:
"Member States shall ensure that national regulatory authorities are 
able to require undertakings providing public communications networks 
to provide information regarding the management of their networks in 
connection with any limitations or restrictions on end-user access to or 
use of services, content or applications. Member States shall ensure 
that national regulatory authorities have all the powers necessary to 
investigate cases in which undertakings have imposed limitations on 
end -user access to services, content or applications" (Emphasis 
added). 42
40 See Impact Assessment, p. 91, supra note 32. 
41 Ibid.
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We believe the Parliament's proposal strikes a good balance between 
expressing itself too soon (it seems economists so far have not really 
achieved a generally accepted view on prioritisation) and/or too late (taking a 
complete "wait-and-see" approach seems risky, since prioritisation may 
possibly affect long-term competition between network operators and 
Internet content providers). Taking into account that prioritisation is not only 
a promising technology to provide (useful) quality of services (yet not fully 
exploited by industry), but also a possible threat to competition in the 
information and communications markets of tomorrow, we believe the 
Parliament's modest proposals are sufficiently effective and proportionate for 
the time being – following the adage "if there is going to be error, it is better 
to err on the liberal side rather than the side of oversuppression" (MÜLLER, 
2008). 
  Conclusions
The new technology of traffic shaping has the potential to challenge the 
long-standing technical principle of the Internet, i.e. the end-to-end principle 
that is considered the accelerator of the robust growth of the Internet at its 
edge for decades. While having technical advantages to support quality of 
service, this new technology also possibly allows network operators to 
discriminate against Internet content providers. In order to prevent the 
possible abuse of this new technology to the detriment of consumers, 
scholars initiated the public debate on keeping the Internet neutral, or 
network neutrality.  
In this article, we have examined the effectiveness and proportionality of 
the current and future EU communications regulatory framework in dealing 
with the most common forms of potentially anti-competitive behaviour.  
This analysis leads us to the following conclusions:  
x  It is difficult, if not impossible, to tackle network neutrality problems 
sufficiently under the current 2003 Regulatory Framework, firstly because 
the electronic communications regulation in principle only deals with 
transmission issues (and not with the relation between network operators 
and content providers), and secondly because the relevant market (retail 
broadband) is not listed as a market susceptible to ex ante regulation.  
x  However, the major network neutrality problems may be effectively 
addressed if the Parliament's reform proposals for the 2003 Regulatory 110     No. 72, 4
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Framework are accepted (although a more explicit clarification that content 
providers can benefit from access obligations imposed on the new 
framework would certainly contribute to more legal certainty). NRAs would 
then be given appropriate tools to deal with network operators that 
unreasonably restrict Internet content providers' and/or end-users' access to 
networks. Hence, the EU's response so far seems based on common sense 
and proportionality: neither a complete hands off approach, nor a Guardian 
Knight willing to sacrifice innovation and economic efficiency at the altar of 
obscure Internet freedoms (that some in the US hold to be sacrosanct). P. VALCKE, L. HOU, D. STEVENS & E. KOSTA  111 
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